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S E C R E T GENEVA 001128

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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
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NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 01127 (SFO-GVA-VII-062)
1B. GENEVA 01028 (SFO-GVA-VII-020)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-066.

12. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (S) The Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) reviewed suggested conforming changes to Articles I, VII, XII, XIV and XV, and sent these Articles back to the Conforming Group. The first detailed discussion of Article III, except for paragraph 8, and Article IV unearthed no significant surprises. End Summary.

14. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Articles VII, XII, XIV and XV Sent Back to Conforming; Article I; Article III - Counting Rules; and Article IV - Limitations;

ARTICLES VII, XII, XIV AND
XV SENT BACK TO CONFORMING

¶5. (S) Mr. Taylor presented articles that were agreed during the previous TTDWG meeting (Ref A) and sent to conforming but had been sent back to the TTDWG for further clarification. Both sides discussed suggested changes in Articles VII, XIII, XIV, and XV, and agreed to send the articles back to the Conforming Group. The sides agreed that the only remaining brackets in Articles XII and XIV will be resolved when all treaty structural issues are decided.

ARTICLE I

¶6. (S) The Conforming Group had returned Article I to the TTDWG with additional text formally linking the protocol to the treaty. The Russian side deemed this important, while the U.S. side considered it to be extraneous text. The sides agreed that the compromise was to refer to "its Protocol" in Article I but as "Protocol to the Treaty" in other Articles, as appropriate.

ARTICLE III - COUNTING RULES

¶7. (S) The U.S. side accepted the Russian-proposed language in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III when Adm Kuznetsov explained that the "...purpose of counting toward the aggregate limit..." was START language. However the Russian side was not willing to accept "...and its associated launcher..." in paragraphs 1(a) and (b), consistent with the

Russian arguments to date. The proposal to collapse the subparagraphs in paragraph 1 on counting of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers was deemed possible but final resolution could not be achieved until the counting rules were finalized.

¶8. (S) Similarly, as the sides considered paragraph 2 Article III positions on counting warheads, the sides agreed that it would not be possible to finalize this text until senior-level agreement was achieved. The Russian side believed that clear definitions could replace paragraphs 3, 4, 8, and the Russian-proposed paragraph 4. The U.S. side did not agree and the text remained bracketed.

¶9. (S) Taylor asked for clarification on the need to specify when "the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM are maintained, stored and transported in stages" first left a production facility in paragraph 7 (a) and (e) for newly constructed strategic offensive arms were subject to limitations of the treaty. Kuznetsov agreed to consider this language further.

¶10. (S) Taylor asked for an explanation of the Russian-Article IV proposed paragraph 3 ("In those cases not provided for by the provisions of this Treaty, strategic offensive arms shall begin to be the subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty in accordance with procedures to be agreed by the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission."). Kuznetsov responded that this paragraph allowed for the resolution of new configurations. He used the example of the RSM-56 which is a canister configured SLBM that had not existed when START was signed and was introduced in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

¶11. (S) The sides agreed on the importance of paragraph 8 setting out the issues of new/existing types and distinguishability but deferred more detailed consideration.

¶12. (S) Kuznetsov objected, in paragraph 9, to the "political incorrectness" of citing the U.S. names for existing types of Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. Taylor agreed to consider this request and coordinate it with the U.S. working group chairs. In response to Kuznetsov's insistence to exclude ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, Taylor explained

the U.S. position that silos and mobile launchers were different. When the Russian side questioned listing air-launched cruise missiles in subparagraph (d), Taylor outlined the importance of this information to inspectors, though he noted that this would likely be resolved when heavy bomber counting rules were agreed.

ARTICLE IV - LIMITATIONS

¶13. (S) Kuznetsov asked what the U.S. reaction was to the Russian paper of November 24, Non-paper "Proposal on Locating Non-Deployed Items" (Ref B). The U.S. side said it was not prepared to respond. Kuznetsov inquired about the U.S. reasoning behind its proposal to limit the number of test heavy bombers to 10. Taylor and Lt Col Comeau explained the U.S. rationale was based on a possible maintenance schedule

and an added reserve. Kuznetsov understood but insisted that there be no numerical limit for non-deployed heavy bombers.

¶14. (S) Dr. Fraley raised the need for modification of the Russian non-paper on Locating Non-Deployed Items to clearly show that items are not allowed at other locations and that "prototypes" should also be introduced. The United States committed to formulate a proposal. The sides discussed the differences between a "prototype" and a "test" item.

¶15. (S) Documents provided:

- Russia:

-- Non-paper of the Russian side, "Proposal on Locating Non-Deployed Items," November 27, 2009, in Russian and unofficial English.

¶16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
LTC LaGraffe
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.

GRIFFITHS